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Contracts for Grownups
WilliamJ. Woodward,Jr.
At the beginning of the 1980s, Frances Kahn Zemans and Victor G.
Rosenblum published a study probing the connection between what lawyers
learned in law school and what they used in practice. The study contained
many provocative findings about the low correlations between even basic
substantive law school courses and the skills used by the practicing lawyer;
no doubt it kindled the now-raging theory-practice debate in legal education circles.2 With the publication of the MacCrate Repor in 1992, the
pressure is 6n to teach students how the law really functions outside the law
school building.
Within the Zemans and Rosenblum study was one finding that has escaped
much attention. While lawyers reported low utilization of the substantive
knowledge they had gained in law school, one substantive area stood out from
the rest in being useful in the day-to-day life of the practitioner. It would
certainly surprise few contracts professors that the subject was contracts.
Contracts was reported helpful to the practice of law by 50.3 percent of the
respondents; the next closest subject was property with 25.2 percent. 4 The
authors observe:
(I] t is perhaps surprising that only one course-contracts-is mentioned by a
majority of the bar with the others cited by no more than one-fourth .... Of
those who cite contacts as particularly helpful to their practice, 45 percent
5
attribute its benefits to the fact that its content underlies most legal issues.
Unfortunately, many law schools deliver this rich subject to first-year students in a required four-hour course during their first semester of law school.6
WilHiamJ. Woodward,Jr., is Professor of Law at Temple University. Thanks to Eleanor Myers and
Candace Zierdt for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
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While contracts is nearly the ideal subject with which to begin law study, the
four-hour first-semester format leaves little time to cover the basics, much less
allow students to consider either the subject's rich theoretical tensions or its
practical applications.
To make matters worse, typical contracts casebooks are structured for the
older six-hour offering, and teachers must patch together a four-hour basic
course from the much larger range of casebook material. If the casebook
contains cross-references or builds on earlier learning from the book's materials, those features can be lost in the patchwork.
The findings of Zemans and Rosenblum suggest a greater curricular emphasis on the subject of contracts. And the broader findings of that study as
well as the thrust of the more recent MacCrate Report suggest a greater
emphasis in the law school classroom on how real lawyers actually use the law
to serve their clients.
A new set of contracts materials, Contracts:Law inAction, by Stewart Macaulay,
John Kidwell, William Whitford, and Marc Galanter, 7 offers an unexpected
way to do both these things at once. The commercial publication of the
Wisconsin contracts materials ought to be big news among contracts teachers."
What might be overlooked by those considering the materials is that the
authors have labored under the four-hour first-year format and have designed
the materials for this type of curriculum. The materials can both augment the
first-year offering and allow students to better understand the many uses to
which contract law can be put in the world of business.
Both Volume I and Volume II extend legal realism by weaving substance
and in-the-street application together. They draw heavily on the authors' (and
others') wide-ranging empirical studies of the law as it reaches and is used by
actual people. They broadly embrace the relational contract as a subject for
study and consider the problems that relational contracts present for neoclassical contract theory. They develop many doctrines pervasively rather than
discretely, requiring students to keep many balls in the air at once. But my
intent is not to offer a comprehensive review of these books; rather my focus is
on Volume III and how it might be used as the backbone for an upper-level
course, Advanced Contracts.'"
7.
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Volume I is a very unconventional set of materials. For example, students begin the course
not with either a real or a hypothetical case but with a 33-page essay covering topics ranging
from how law study is conducted, through different approaches to the classroom, to a history
of contracts courses and different approaches to the subject matter. The authors also cover
the formal doctrines of offer and acceptance and consideration through text, Volume I at
240-48, 303-13; they cover their uve as lawyer tools pervasively throughout the materials.
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first-year students and upper-level students). The other is an abridged one-volume book
designed for those with the more traditional six-hour offering. What would not be obvious
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My goal here is simply to suggest that teachers of four-hour contracts
courses consider developing such an upper-class offering with these materials.
The book is so different, provocative, and rich that it will deepen students'
understanding and enjoyment of contracts at a theoretical level and, at the
same time, develop their understanding of how the law of contracts actually
works in business and other settings in the real world.
Why Upper-Level Contracts?
Why would one want to offer an advanced contractscourse? Wouldn't it be
redundant? Isn't the upper-level curriculum a time for UCC and other more
specialized courses?
Many of the reasons for considering an upper-level contracts course are
linked to the specifics of the materials to which I will turn shortly. There are,
however, some preliminary points. To begin with, an advanced contracts
course built on these materials will be broader than any UCC offering while
giving students a substantial dose of Article 2 of the UCC. Within the materials
is major emphasis on UCC innovations in contract formation" and on the
statute's approach to default and remedy. 2 But while Advanced Contracts
could satisfy a curricular need to expose students to Article 2, it would not be
a sales course. The UCC material is fixed in a far broader context that explores
how notions of reciprocity, materiality, and interpretation stretch across different kinds of contracts. These materials also expose students to deeper
questions about how business people make and interpret agreements, how
their transactions actually work, and how the remedies system operates when
they don't work.
Second, while the treatment of the subject is far more sophisticated than
the first-year offering, it is still contracts, and it might attract students to a
business course (the advanced contracts course I describe isjust that) in a way
that other commercial courses would not. Once inside the course, the student
will find familiar vocabulary and doctrine that will augment a deepening
understanding. From the teacher's perspective, one can build directly on the
knowledge both of contracts and of the legal system that these more mature
and legally sophisticated students arrive with. And because it is not a firstsemester first-year course, one can pay less attention to first-semester teaching
objectives-case reading and analysis, issue formulation, and the like. The
focus can be more directly on contracts,rather than contracts and all the other
things students need to master as they begin law study.
The materials that make up Volume II offer the central reasons for considering an advanced contracts offering: these materials will enable students to
develop a perspective on contracting-and the lawyer's role in contracting(perhaps even to the book's authors) is that Volume II is a stand-alone casebook that can
support an advanced course built either on Volume I or on a four-hour first-year offering
using other materials. The authors might consider renaming the book to make its ability to
stand by itself more obvious.
11. E.g., Volume II at 101-20, 201-48.
12. E.g., id. at 457-595.
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that is unattainable in the first year or, for that matter, in most upper-level
courses.
Volume II focuses mostly on contracting within the business context. Most
of the cases are business cases, and most contain complicated, interrelated
contracts issues. 13 But it is the text, notes, and questions that make these
materials so important pedagogically. Volume II (like Volume I) includes a
large amount of material about the context within which contracting occurs.
Providing this far wider context for contracting behavior allows students to
develop perspective on the role of contract law in business contracting and to
begin to understand how lawyers and clients actually use contract law to
advance their objectives. It is this very different frame of reference that makes
an advanced class using these materials so potentially attractive.
The Amalgam of Practice and Theory
The authors of Contracts:Law in Action believe that it is important to teach
students how contract doctrine functions in a real world that includes scores
of variables and substantial doses of irrationality. The law cannot operate
without human intervention, and that intervention can be irrational, vindictive, ill-informed, orjust plain stupid. People can operate in a way that law or
theory would not predict because people are subject to pressures and temptations that theory may not recognize. In business settings, in particular, economics, judgment, personality, and law often combine to yield decisions that
the law on its own would not produce. Lawyers understand that parts of legal
problems are often interrelated, that legal doctrine is often interrelated
within a subject (as might be the law of consideration and unconscionability),
or across subjects (as might be negligence and contractual privity"). They also
understand that client decisions are often based on a complex mix of law and
variables outside the law. Lawyers need to understand this complexity; students must learn how to ask the right questions. The Wisconsin books aim at
developing this kind of understanding of the subject.
The authors are well qualified to approach their subject this way. Stewart
Macaulay is, perhaps, the first of the modem empiricistsl--scholars who study
the actual workings of the law in action and reflect on what that actual

13. Volume I differs from many other contracts casebooks in that it has a far smaller proportion
of chestnuts which seem to students distant from the contemporary scene. The book is also
more concentrated and, by raising many disparate issues at the same time, it shows students
how legal doctrine is interrelated and used by real lawyers.
14. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
15. Macaulay is most commonly identified with the law and society movement of which he was a
founder. While "empiricist" refers to those deploying similar methodology which attempts to
consider law as part of a far larger system of human relationships, the newer name suggests
hard-edged, scientific rigor while the older term may suggest the opposite. This may explain
the recent ascent of "empiricist" in business law scholarship as a term to describe the kind of
scholarship Macaulay and his school have been doing all along. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki,
The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 Va. L. Rev. 1887, 1890 n.9 (1994); see generally
WilliamJ. Woodward,Jr., Empiricists and the Collapse of the Theory-Practice Dichotomy in
the Large Classroom: A Review of LoPucki and Warren's Secured Credit:A SystemV Approach, 74
Wash. U. L.Q. 419 (1996).
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operation means both for legal theory and for legal practice. 16 The empiricists
have extended legal realism from studying what courts do about disputes 17 to
studying how people use the law in solving their problems. By extending the
frame of reference beyond a closed set of legal materials and actors, empiricist
researchers have exposed the role of such variables as business reputation and
repeat business, 8 leverage, 19 and local culture ° interacting with the law to
yield outcomes.
As summaries or excerpts from this empirical research appear throughout
the materials, the wide frame of reference becomes an integral part of both
volumes of Contracts:Law in Action, connecting students much more directly
to the actual uses of contracts in business and the roles of lawyers in that
context. This will naturally help students learn what lawyers actually do with
legal materials-and will narrow the gap between law school and practice.
Implications for "Coverage" and "Organization"
The different approach these authors take to their subject has major
implications for coverage and organization. They have taken their views-that
"law" is embedded within and inseparable from a far larger context-into the
organization of the materials themselves. This means that they include a
larger amount of "nontraditional" material than other casebooks. The authors also believe that many parts of the law of contracts are interrelated with
one another and with the broader context. This means that topics are less
doctrinally distinct and that several are often taken up at the same time.
Understanding the authors' approach to coverage and organization requires
a more detailed excursion into the materials themselves.
Volume II is designed to focus mostly on business contracts and on performance issues in contracting.2 ' Most of the cases are complex business cases,
and there is a strong emphasis on Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
16. See, e.g., Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: APreliminary Study, 28 Am. Soc.
Rev. 55 (1963); The Use and Non-Use of Contract in the Manufacturing Industry, Prac. Law.,
Nov. 1963, at 13 [hereinafter Macaulay, Use and Non-Use].
17. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush 12 (Dobbs Ferry, 1951) ("Mhat these officials do about
disputes is, to my mind, the law itself ").
18. Macaulay, Use and Non-Use, supranote 16; cf. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out

Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 Law & Soc'y Rev. 95 (1974); RussellJ.
Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Practice and Policy, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 1.
19. Cf. Arthur A. Leff, Injury, Ignorance and Spite-The Dynamics of Coercive Collection, 80

Yale LJ. 1 (1970); Galanter, supra note 18. While neither of these authors conducted
extensive field work to support his analysis, by expanding the earlier frame of reference, they
prompt the reader to think differently about the subject matter.
20. See Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67 Am.
Bankr. L.J. 501 (1993); Teresa A. Sullivan et al., As We Forgive Our Debtors 246-52 (New

York, 1989).
21. Volume II is designed for the University of Wisconsin contracts elective that follows the basic
course using Volume I. Volume I acquaints students with the "traditional" meat of the first
year but has a far greater emphasis on longer-term contracting and has remedies coverage
(including restitution and various forms of promisee "cancellation") that is extensive and
pervasive. Using Volume II after a first-year offering that used other materials probably
means a greater chance for overlap (at least conceptually and, perhaps, in cases or doctrine)
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Code.2 2 There is also an emphasis on interpretation and the role interpretation plays in the framing and solving of contract disputes.
It is easy enough to describe the formal arrangement of the material. The
book begins with contract formation, emphasizing mistake and the remedial
options that come with avoiding contracts on account of mistake. It proceeds
through incomplete planning (e.g., indefiniteness), interpretation, modification, performance and breach, and adjusting contracts on account of changed
circumstances. But such a description conveys a far less integrated approach
to coverage than what we find in these materials. Macaulay et al. deviate
substantially from the norm in contracts materials by examining a given topic
from many more perspectives than is usual in law school casebooks, and by
presenting cases which, like real life, combine several issues in one problem.
Thus, "coverage" of "a topic" can be far broader than the norm, and many
topics are "covered" pervasively throughout the materials. This mirrors law
practice much better than does the pigeonhole treatment of contract doctrine
that characterizes (perhaps necessarily) many first-year contracts courses. This
very different approach to organization and coverage virtually guarantees
little redundancy, even if students have covered exactly the same topic in firstyear Contracts.
Intensity of Coverage
Students will have seen many of the doctrines raised in Volume II, but they
will not have covered them in such depth or been capable of doing so in their
first semester of law school. An early-and obvious-example is the book's
coverage of the mistaken bid in contracting, a classic problem covered by
many contracts casebooks within their "offer and acceptance" topics. ' The
authors here start with an introduction which lays out the mistaken-bid
with the earlier materials and a somewhat less reliable student information base on which to
build.
I offered a two-credit elective, Advanced Contracts, while visiting at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School during fall 1995. Students in my class had used Robert E. Scott &
Douglas L. Leslie, Contract Law and Theory, 2d ed. (Charlottesville, 1993), or.John P.
Dawson et al., Cases and Comment on Contracts, 6th ed. (Westbury, 1993). A couple of
students noted some doctrinal redundancy in their evaluations of the course, but otherwise
there was little evidence of repetitiveness. Because some of the students in my class had not
had any contract remedies in the first-year offering, I began the course with a two-hour
overview of remedies issues. I found a two-hour course to be too short to comfortably cover
the whole book.
22. Article 2 of the UCC is sufficiently developed within the materials for one to use an advanced
contracts course based on these materials as a broader substitute for a sales course. In so
doing, one would lose UCC methodology and detail from the sales course but would gain
breadth and context that may be lacking in the more technical sales offering.
23. See, e.g., Dawson et al., supranote 21, at 402-14 (precontractual obligation); Arthur Rosett,
Contract Law and ItsApplication, 5th ed., 569 (Westbury, 1994) (duration of offers); Charles
L. Knapp & Nathan M. Crystal, Problems in Contract Law, 3d ed., 231-44 (Boston, 1993)
(limiting offeror's power to revoke); E. Allan Farnsworth & William F. Young, Cases and
Materials on Contracts, 5th ed., 253 (Westbury, 1995) (precontractual liability).
The problem involves the subcontractor that submits a bid on which the prime contractor
computes and submits its own bid. The prime is awarded the contract, but before it has
formally accepted the subcontractor's bid, the subcontractor discovers a mistake and attempts to withdraw.
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problem, summarizes some of the research that has considered it, and locates
it within a larger context. 4 Then comes a text summary of the mailbox rule
and its implications for mistaken offers, followed by a text summary of the
traditional and UCC approaches to the firm offer, and summaries of the two
classic cases on the subjectJames Baird Co. v. Gimbel Brothers,Inc.' and Drennan
v. Star Paving C0.2 6 Then follows a summary of an early empirical study of
bidding in the construction industry,2 7 followed by an appellate case adopting

a promissory estoppel theory to find for the prime contractor, and a series of
questions and notes which concludes with strategies for representing the
mistaken subcontractor who wants out.2 8 These twenty-seven pages are the
material for one class.
Obviously, one could not teach this much material in the same way one
would teach a first-year class. Rather, the assignment provides, in essence, the
background for a sophisticated class discussion of far deeper issues. What are
the empirical assumptions these different courts make in coming to their
judgments? How do the differentjudgments square with-and affect-actual
bidding practice? How good is the litigation system in delivering appropriate
facts on whichjudges make assumptions about business practices? What should
the rule be in this situation? What assumptions underlie ourjudgments of the
correct rule?
This mistaken-bid example is typical: the authors of Volume II take a
problem, occasionally a familiar one, and examine it from multiple perspectives. In the process they repeatedly demonstrate that there are no pat solutions and that even the problems students saw in first-year Contracts are far

24. Included in the two-page introduction are references to Fuller's claslic article on the reliance
interest, the classical contract doctrine's answer that there is no relief for unilateralmistake,
reference to business understanding which does not track the "moment of the making"
approach of classical contract doctrine, the realities of a hectic bidding process and possibilities within bidding processes for kickbacks, and ethical responses to a mistake in the context
of bidding. As to the latter:
[W]e might ask as a matter of ethics whether a person who has made a
promise based on a mistake should stand behind it. Would the good person
back out if her lawyer told her that no legally binding agreement was made
under the rules of contract law? Second, we might ask whether the ethical
person would hold another to a contract once she discovers their agreement
was based on the other's mistake? Third, we can ask whether legal rules
should reflect whatever moral decisions we reach.
Volume II at 33-34.
25. 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933) (Hand, J.) (holding that the subcontractor could withdraw
because there had been no acceptance of the offer and the prime, being a sophisticated
business person, was not entitled to rely on an unaccepted offer).
26. 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958) (Traynor, J.) (adopting a promissory estoppel theory to reach a
result contrary to that in Baird).
27. Paraphrased version of Note, Another Look at Construction Bidding and Contracts Formation, 53Va. L. Rev. 1720 (1967), inVolume II at 41.
28. Their summary draws together many strategies, much as the lawyer faced with such a
problem would. They summarize the strategies (with commentary): (1) attacking the firm
offer rule (in Restatement § 87); (2) construing the bid; (3) using the rules of mistake and
Restatement § 90 (against the prime); (4) trying to prove bid shopping and chopping; and
(5) asserting the Statute of Frauds. Volume II at 56-60.
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more complex and difficult than they once thought. Coverage of any contracts
topic with this many variables at this level of sophistication is simply impossible
during the first semester of law school. While a teacher might elect not to
cover this particular topic during an advanced contracts course, a policy of
avoiding redundancy would not require it.
Pervasive Coverage
The mistaken-bid material surfaces within a section titled "The Risk of
Ambiguity or Misunderstanding." Other topics surface occasionally but don't
get the focused coverage just described. A good example is the book's coverage of third-party beneficiaries.
The topic makes its debut in a note to EnricoFarms,Inc. v. H.J.Heinz Co.,2 9 a
case that formally begins the "Parol Evidence Rule, Misrepresentation, and
Promissory Estoppel" unit. ° The contracts formally involved were tomato
sales contracts, but one of the claims was made by the harvester of the
tomatoes, who would have nothing to harvest if the buyer didn't perform its
contract to buy from the seller. The court identified the claim as a third-party
beneficiary claim, but its characterization had little to do with the court's
decision. The authors define the third-party beneficiary idea generally in a
note and preview the topic as a coming attraction."' They return to the topic
nearly 100 pages later in a classic case involving a subcontractor's attempted
recovery against the prime contractor's surety.
The bond in Jacobs Associates v. Argonaut Insurance Co.3 2 was structured so
that it would not be payable if the contractor satisfied several conditions, one
of which was "Pay all persons, firms and corporations who perform labor .... ,,3 The case is formally presented as a case where the question is
whether words in a suretyship contract ought to be interpreted as words of
condition or words of promise running from surety to prime contractor. In
Jacobs, the court interpreted the clause as promissory and permitted the

29. 629 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1980).
30. Volume 11 at 337.
31. The explanation theygive is representative of the direct approach the authors take when they
describe contract law:
You might have been puzzled by the fact that Palladino, the harvester, is
apparently complaining about the breach of a promise that Contadina made
to Pippo. The Court assumes, perhaps merely for the sake of argument in this
case, that Palladino has a right to complain about Contadina's failure to keep
its promise to Pippo. It is clear that since apparently Pippo has arranged for
Palladino to harvest the Pippo tomatoes, Palladino has a financial interest in
the harvesting of those tomatoes. Courts sometimes allow those who will
benefitfrom a performance of a promise to sue for its enforcement. The rules
governingjust when non-parties can sue to enforce promises will be taken up
in a latersection. When we do take it up, you might come back to this case and
reflect on whether it is a strong case for the acknowledgment of third-party
rights.
Id. at 339.
32. 580 P.2d 529 (Or. 1978), inVolume II at 427.
33. Volume II at 427.
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subcontractor to sue the surety directly on the bond. One cannot understand
the interpretive moves made by the court without understanding the pressure
that this setting creates to recognize the third-party beneficiary rights of the
subcontractor. Notes following the case describe the law; classroom discussion
can focus on interpretation, the dynamics of third-party beneficiary doctrine,
or their interrelationship in this case.
This approach to organization-locating a case with multiple issues at a
particular point but leaving the other issues in place-reinforces past learning
and previews coming attractions throughout the course. Students see various
doctrinal tools in multiple settings over the course of the semester and see
those tools working with others in given cases. But beyond the pedagogical
gains, the presence of multiple, diverse legal and nonlegal issues within single
cases also models the way legal problems arise and are framed in real life. The
approach contrasts sharply with the way those problems are pursued in most
first-year classes.
Thematic Coverage
Many identifiable themes run through Volume II, but it is sometimes hard
to know which of the themes were included by the authors and which are
constructed by the reader. The pervasive approach to much of the doctrine
and the authors' way of allowing the complexity of many of the cases to reach
the student allow teachers (and students) to find and develop their own views
of how (or whether) the parts of the whole fit together.
There is one strong authorial focus that I hesitate to call a "theme." As one
might expect from scholars with an empiricist outlook, the focus is neither
doctrinal nor theoretical. Rather, a situation recurs throughout the book in
which the parties have attempted to structure their future and, through no
apparent fault of either party, something unanticipated spoils their plans.
Typically, the relationship has gone some way forward, generating some
reliance losses on one side or the other. For this kind of situation, classical
contract offers the remedial possibilities of full enforcement or full rescission,
a Hobson's choice in the hardest of these cases. Certain questions recur: What
doctrinal tools do lawyers use in litigating these cases? What interpretive or
other moves do courts use in adjudicating these issues? What remedial options
are available (and how does that availability interact with the first two questions)? What institutional limits does the litigation or legal system impose in
fashioning creative solutions to these problems? And so on.
We first encounter a version of the paradigm situation with the mistake
doctrines through Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 4 the famous Peerless Case. The problem reemerges in the mistaken-bid materials and returns full force in
Chapter 6, "Adjusting to Changed Circumstances: Risks Assumed and Imposed." 35 This long last-chapter, perhaps the richest in the book, exposes

34. 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864), inVolume II at 21.
35. Volume II at 621-770.
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students to an entire range of impossibility, commercial impracticability, and
7
6
frustration of purpose cases from Paradine v. Jane' and Taylor v. CaldwelP
through huge modem cases such as Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group,
Inc.38 and the Westinghouselitigation.39It contains material on the 1971 Lockheed
bailout by the Nixon administration 40 and comparative materials about the
unsatisfactory British experience with giving judges discretion to allocate
losses. 4 As might be expected, the authors offer few solutions; rather, their
offering to students and teacher is the assembly of a diverse sampling of fact
situations, attempted solutions, opinion, and the like to equip the reader to
understand the complexity of the problems. These materials, particularly
those in Chapter 6, show students how deep the issues can go. That perception will reduce the chances that, as lawyers, they will stop short in analyzing
the problems of their own clients.

The claim I've made here is a modest one: given the use that practitioners
make of contracts in their practices, law schools ought to consider offering
more contracts study. Contracts:Law inAction, Volume II, offers law schools an
easy way to make an advanced course available to students. While the institution and the students will benefit from such an offering, perhaps the best
rewards will come to the teacher of the course. That teacher will have the
privilege of leading a sophisticated conversation with a group of motivated,
smart students using reading materials sufficiently rich and open-ended to be
unique in the literature. A teacher's own understanding and enjoyment of the
subject will naturally flourish. This is what great teaching experiences are
made of.

36. 82 Eng. Rep. (KB. 1647), in Volume II at 623.
37. 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (KB. 1863), in Volume II at 627.
38. 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980), inVolume II at 702.
39. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 517 F. Supp. 440 (E.D. Va. 1981), in
Volume II at 742.
40. Volume II at 693-702.
41. Id. at 646-50.

